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The First Amendment in the Multicultural
Climate of Colleges and Universities:
A Story Ending with
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez
by BLAKE LAWRENCE*
If there is a time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.
-Justice Brandeis'
Introduction
The First Amendment, being a cornerstone of American
democracy and central to the ideal of American citizenry, prevents a
governmental actor from inhibiting the speech of a private actor.
However, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that
not all speech enjoys full First Amendment protection. Cases such as
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,2 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,' and
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul hold that fighting words, obscenity, and
hate speech, respectively, may be limited without disrupting
Constitutional bounds. Public policy supports such limitations-
fighting words meant to invoke a response lead to disruption and
violence, obscene speech subjects the unwilling listener to
* Associate, Hall Estill, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. J.D. Oklahoma City
University School of Law, 2011; B.A. Texas Christian University, 2008. Staff Editor,
Oklahoma City University Law Review. The author would like to express genuine thanks
to and admiration for Prof. Dennis Arrow, who provided useful feedback and guidance
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1. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
2. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
3. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
4. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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communication that is undesired and potentially harmful, and hate
speech limits respectful discourse in a civil society.
Those limitations on speech, however, occur in the "public"
setting and speech will be treated differently based on where it is
uttered.! Public colleges and universities present a much different
forum than the general public. Universities play host to a
multicultural environment where students of different backgrounds,
cultures, and religions coalesce and must find a way to coexist. This is
especially true since public colleges cannot base admissions decisions
on race or background-leading to diverse student bodies which the
Supreme Court recognizes as an important component of higher
education.' Further, in order to recruit active student participation in
on-campus activities, colleges allow students to form groups and
associations for like-minded students to meet each other and
participate in various social and philanthropic activities. Once such
groups are allowed, public colleges create a "limited public forum"
and must abide by the rules that they themselves set.' In recognition
of their diverse student bodies, public colleges and universities should
encourage different views and beliefs within their student
organizations and implement "all-comers" policies towards individual
speech and expressive association. These policies reach what should
be a college's core mission: To educate, inform, and present students
with different ideas and cultures.
The Supreme Court has made clear that it will treat speech on
public college and university campuses differently than speech in a
public forum, and will give strong deference to university officials
working "on the ground," trusting their judgment of what works best
in a particular college's unique environment. Part I of this article
comprehensively discusses the "limited public forum" analysis as a
method of proscribing speech. It also outlines the major cases dealing
with the creation of the limited public forum on public college
5. For instance, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously declared that "[t]he most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theater and causing a panic." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
6. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244 (2003). Both Grutter and Gratz hold that diverse student bodies serve a
compelling state interest, allowing for some types of lawful discrimination. While the
Court held that the admissions policies in Grutter were constitutional, it found that those
in Gratz were not.
7. Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010) [hereinafter CLS v. Martinez] ("governmental
entities establish limited public forums by opening property 'limited to use by certain
groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects."').
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campuses, revealing that what works best in higher education may not
fit for primary and secondary education, and vice versa. Part I.C.
explains that the Supreme Court has always given some deference to
school officials in making decisions regarding student campus speech,
and explores whether that is the best policy or merely the most
efficient choice for disposing of campus speech cases. Part II
discusses the most recent high court case on the issue, Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez,' where the Court determined that a limited public
forum existed, and that the policies put in place by UC Hastings
College of the Law were reasonable and content neutral. The Part
will also discuss some of the interesting and potentially problematic
sections of the Martinez opinion.
I. The Limited Public Forum Analysis as a
Method of Proscribing Speech
A well-known line of Supreme Court cases has held that a
college campus is not an open forum, and colleges and universities
will be subjected to a lesser form of scrutiny when they proscribe
speech. Defined by the Court, "[a] public forum may be created for a
limited purpose such as use by certain groups or for the discussion of
certain subjects."9 In that way, colleges "confine[] a speech forum to
the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created."10 That
"limited and legitimate purpose" on college campuses may be to
encourage educational discourse, to present differing views (albeit
peacefully), or to allow contrary viewpoints in an acceptable forum
for expression with each other. Further, "the Court observed that
universities 'occupy a special niche in [the] constitutional tradition of
the First Amendment,' and thus are entitled to substantial
'educational autonomy."' The limited nature of the public college
First Amendment forum presents an effective vehicle for analyzing
speech that occurs on college campuses, which "demand[] a different
approach to otherwise generally applicable First Amendment
principles."12 The applicable analysis that courts undertake after
determining a limited public forum exists respects the speaker's rights
8. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971.
9. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 n.7 (1983).
10. Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,829 (1995).
11. Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1497, 1499 (2007) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329). Deference to school administration
in judicial analysis will be discussed infra Part II.C.
12. Horwitz, supra note 11 at 1499.
of speech and association as well as the rights of the university as
property owner and educational institution.I
However, the rights of a university to proscribe speech (or,
conversely, of a student's right to speech itself) are not absolute. A
university policy for proscribing certain speech must be reasonable,
"taking into account all of the circumstances" 4 and must be viewpoint
neutral."
A. Seminal Student Organization Cases from the Supreme Court
1. Healy v. Jamesl
Probably the best examinations of speech proscribed by a
university within a limited public forum occur in Healy v. James,"
Widmar v. Vincent," and Rosenberger v. University of Virginia."
Healy arises in the early 1970s "out of a denial by a state college of
official recognition to a group of students who desired to form a local
chapter of Students for a Democratic Society ("SDS")."20 During that
time "[t]here had been widespread civil disobedience on some
campuses, accompanied by the seizure of buildings, vandalism, and
arson," and SDS chapters "had been a catalytic force" in some of the
unrest.21 A group of students attempted to form a SDS chapter and
filed the proper paperwork for recognition as a campus organization.2
The request specified three purposes for the proposed
organization's existence. It would provide 'a forum of
discussion and self-education for students developing an
analysis of American society'; it would serve as 'an agency for
integrating thought with action so as to bring about constructive
changes'; and it would endeavor to provide 'a coordinating
13. See CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2986.
14. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985).
15. See Horwitz, supra note 11, at 1505 (stating that "the very essence of the content-
neutrality doctrine is the attempt to craft a neutral rule that applies across a variety of
instances of protected speech.").
16. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
17. Id.
18. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
19. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819.
20. Healy, 408 U.S. at 170.
21. Id. at 171.
22. Id.
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body for relating the problems of leftist students' with other
interested groups on campus and in the community.23
Based on the language in the students' petition for recognition
and the national reputation of SDS, the administration of Central
Connecticut State College (the university president, specifically)
feared that SDS would attempt to violently assemble or protest, and
"found that the organization's philosophy was antithetical to the
school's policies, and that the group's independence [from the
national organization] was doubtful."24 Denial of official campus
recognition resulted in SDS being forbidden from using campus
bulletin boards and using campus facilities for meetings and events.2
Further, without official status as a student organization, SDS was
unable to reach its goal of significantly increasing its membership.26
The student group then sought recourse in the courts.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that "state
colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of
the First Amendment"2 and that "'[n]either students [n]or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate."'2m Then it reasoned that, due to the
particularities of the college campus, "First Amendment protections
should apply with less force on college campuses than in the
community at large," but "'the vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools."" The Court must therefore attempt to balance students'
legitimate First Amendment rights against allowing college campuses
to remain a peaceful "marketplace of ideas.""o
The Healy Court continued by stating that "a college has the
inherent power to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has the
inherent power properly to discipline; that it has the power
appropriately to protect itself and its property; [and] that it may
23. Id. at 172.
24. Id. at 175. The local chapter, in its own defense, stated that if granted university
recognition the chapter would not follow the national organization's beliefs. The
university found that explanation unpersuasive. Id.
25. Id. at 176.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 180.
28. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
29. Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
30. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003).
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expect that its students adhere to generally accepted standards of
conduct."" Since students, by enrolling in public higher education,
can expect their conduct to be regulated in some way, the Court thus
reasons that a college has the "inherent power to discipline," which
logically includes the ability to punish certain types of speech.32 "Just
as in the community at large, reasonable regulations with respect to
the time, the place, and the manner in which student groups conduct
their speech-related activities must be respected."3 1
Therefore, colleges and universities may enforce requirements
that official recognition of campus groups occur only after the groups
manifest a willingness to "adhere to reasonable campus law."34 "Such
a requirement does not impose an impermissible condition on the
student's associational rights."" In that way, a group's associational
rights are not infringed and the campus can expect all groups to
"conform with reasonable standards respecting conduct."3 6  The
Court goes as far as stating that conforming with reasonable conduct
standards "is a minimal requirement, in the interest of the entire
academic community, of any group seeking the privilege of official
recognition."" While the Court in Healy remanded the case for
rehearing based on the lack of evidence that the petitioners could
abide by reasonable campus policies, it laid the foundation that a
university could deny recognition of a campus organization based on
a belief that the group would not adhere to reasonable standards
respecting conduct, which may include university policies of non-
discrimination.
31. Healy, 408 U.S. at 192 (quoting Esteban v. Cent. Miss. State Coll., 415 F.2d 1077,
1089 (8th Cir. 1969)).
32. While public colleges and universities must keep all actions within constitutional
limits, private colleges maintain more of a contractual relationship with their students.
For example, by attending a private college the student agrees to give up certain rights,
which are generally outlined in a student manual. Those rules/limitations need not always
follow the same constitutional limitations as public colleges and universities. See Centre
College v. Trzop, 127 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Ky. 2003) ("The relationship between a private
college and its students can be characterized as contractual in nature. Therefore, students
who are disciplined are entitled only to those procedural safeguards which the school
specifically agrees to provide.").
33. Healy, 408 U.S. at 192-93.
34. Id. at 193.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
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3. Widmar v. Vincent
Widmar v. Vincent38 concerned members of a religious group at
the University of Missouri at Kansas City ("UMKC") which brought
an action challenging a university policy that excluded religious
groups from open access to meeting rooms despite university facilities
being generally available for any activity planned by a registered
student group.3 9 A religious group named Cornerstone challenged the
policy, which "prohibits the use of University buildings or grounds
'for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching."' 40 The Court
determined that the university had created a limited public forum
"[t]hrough its policy of accommodating [other student groups']
meetings . . . . Having done so, the University has assumed an
obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under
applicable constitutional norms."41
Unlike Healy, the college in this instance sought to limit any
association between itself and religion, claiming a compelling interest
in "maintaining strict separation" between the two.42  Since
Cornerstone desired to use campus facilities for religious worship, the
university, in line with its policy, denied its continued existence. The
Court "agree[d] that the interest of the University in complying with
its constitutional obligations may be characterized as compelling. It
does not follow, however, that an 'equal access' policy would be
incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases." 43 In
effect, the university policy limited only religious speech, confining
the limited public forum to discussion of all topics but religion.
While the UMKC should be congratulated for its attempt to
safeguard constitutional rights for its students (and for itself), it
misconstrued the nature of its own interest. "It is possible-perhaps
even foreseeable-that religious groups will benefit from access to
University facilities. But this Court has explained that a religious
organization's enjoyment of merely 'incidental' benefits does not
violate the prohibition against the 'primary advancement' of
religion.'" To avoid violating the Establishment Clause, a public
university's policy must clear the three-prong test established in
38. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
39. Id. at 265-68.
40. Id. at 265 (quoting the relevant university policy).
41. Id. at 267.
42. Id. at 275.
43. Id. at 271.
44. Id. at 273 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973)).
Lemon v. Kurtzman: "First, the [governmental policy] must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... finally, the
[policy] must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' 45  In this case, the UMKC policy clearly has a secular
purpose as it in no way promotes a particular religious viewpoint.
Further, satisfying the third prong of analysis, the policy does not
foster an unnecessary entanglement with religion. To the contrary,
the policy exhibits a "hands-off" approach to religion in its entirety,
taking care not to endorse or lambast any religion at all. The second
prong of the test is where the UMKC policy encounters some
difficulty. Since the policy, in essence, prohibits all religion from
being discussed or practiced on campus, it inhibits religion, violating
the second prong of the Lemon test.4
In the end, Widmar's outcome is determined by the fact that the
university singled out only religious groups, rendering the policy not
viewpoint neutral, a required constitutional component.4 The
school's interest "in maintaining strict separation of church and State
45. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 646, 653 (1980)).
46. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272.
47. Id. at 271.
48. See CALVIN R. MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND
LIBERTIES 789-90 (3rd ed. 2009).
Content-based regulations are those that are aimed at the subject matter of
the speech (e.g., "no political speech"). Viewpoint-based regulations-laws
that discriminate on the basis of a specific viewpoint (e.g., "no libertarian
speech")-are merely a more sharply focused subset of content-based
regulations. On the other hand, content-neutral regulations are indifferent
to the subject matter or viewpoint expressed ....
In general, content based regulations are presumed to be void; the
government bears the burden of justifying them by proving that they are
necessary to achieve a compelling public objective.
Id. See also R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech:
The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REv. 333, 333 (2006):
[T]he distinction between regulations that are content-based or content-
neutral is central to contemporary free speech law. A leading scholar has
gone so far as to argue that "[tioday, virtually every free speech case turns
on the application of the distinction between content-based and content-
neutral laws." The sheer number of cases referring to this distinction is,
after a historically late start, by now in the thousands. Justice O'Connor,
citing a range of free speech cases, has written that "[t]he normal inquiry
that our doctrine dictates is, first, to determine whether a regulation is
content based or content neutral, and then, based on the answer to that
question, to apply the proper level of scrutiny."
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is not sufficiently compelling to justify viewpoint discrimination
against religious speech."49
3. Rosenberger v. University of Virginia
The Supreme Court used its analyses of Healy and Widmar to
decide Rosenberger v. University of Virginia.50 The case involved the
University of Virginia's denial of funding for reimbursement of
printing costs to Wide Awake Productions, a philosophical and
religious magazine created "to facilitate discussion which fosters an
atmosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints."
Members of the group brought suit, "alleg[ing] that refusal to
authorize payment of the printing costs of the publication, solely on
the basis of its religious editorial viewpoint, violated their rights to
freedom of speech and press, to the free exercise of religion, and to
equal protection of the law."52 While the case involves access to funds
and not facilities, it still deals with the prohibition of a certain type of
speech based upon the content of the message itself, which renders it
not content neutral.
The Court began its analysis by referring to the applicable forum
as "a forum more in the metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic
sense,"" but relied on well-established limited public forum cases,
declaring that
Once [a State] has opened a limited forum ... the State must
respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set. The State may
not exclude speech where its distinction is not reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the forum, nor may it
discriminate against speech on the basis of its viewpoint.
The University of Virginia acknowledged that "ideologically
driven attempts to suppress a particular point of view are
presumptively unconstitutional in funding, as in other contexts.",5
Further, "[tihe Guideline invoked by the University ... effects a
sweeping restriction on student thought and student inquiry in the
49. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2987-88 (2010) (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at
270).
50. Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
51. Id. at 825-26.
52. Id. at 827.
53. Id. at 830.
54. Id. at 829 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 830.
context (maybe in the forum?) of University sponsored
publications."S6 Since protected speech was suppressed by denial of
access to funds, the University denied the student members their right
to free speech.' Quite simply, Rosenberger stands for the blanket
proposition that a university may not generally withhold benefits
(whether monetary benefits or the benefits of recognition) from
student groups based solely on the group's religious viewpoint.
B. Similar Application to High School Speech? Compare Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier
Healy, Widmar, and Rosenberger" all stand for the proposition
that once a public university has created a limited public forum, the
university must respect the lawful boundaries it has set for itself. Of
course, that assumes that the policies a university crafts can
reasonably further the ideal of a college campus as a "marketplace of
ideas"" and that the policies are viewpoint and content neutral. As
the cases explained above show, even when a policy is otherwise
reasonable, a court will declare it invalid if it is not content neutral.
As noted, these cases involved institutions of higher education.
Another landmark case, with facts similar to Rosenberger, arose in
the context of a high school. The case thus presents a noticeably
different lens through which to examine a familiar problem.
56. Id. at 836.
57. Id. at 837.
58. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
59. While some may argue that the ideal of "liberal education" in America is slowly
eroding to a more vocational training educational system (one in which students choose
educational paths with the end goal of acquiring jobs instead of knowledge), many in
higher education believe to the contrary. Take, for example, this excerpt:
There are fewer students majoring in humanities fields than was once the
case, but undergraduates continue to take courses in literature, art, music,
and philosophy; despite an uncertain job market, people continue to apply
to doctoral programs in those fields; and a great deal of scholarship
continues to get published. The humanities disciplines may go through a
period of reorganization, but they aren't likely to become extinct.
Louis MENAND, THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS; REFORM AND RESISTANCE IN THE
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 62-63 (2010).
A strong emphasis in liberal education will encourage students with diverging/differing
viewpoints to continue to discuss their differences and similarities. The necessity and
efficiency of campuses which maintain an "all-comers" policy for student groups will likely
continue to increase as numbers in liberal arts majors increases, due to the liberal idea that
there is no one "right" solution to a complex problem.
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Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeierm "concerns the extent to
which educators may exercise editorial control over the contents of a
high school newspaper produced as part of the school's journalism
curriculum.",6  Student staff members of the Spectrum, the school
newspaper at Hazelwood East High School, claimed that school
officials impeded their First Amendment rights "by deleting two
pages of articles from the May 13, 1983, issue of Spectrum."62
Factually, the acting supervisor of the newspaper deleted two articles
from the Spectrum's last issue of the school year due to privacy
concerns and a lack of time available before the summer break to edit
the articles.6 1 "He concluded that his only options under the
circumstances were to publish a four-page newspaper instead of the
planned six-page newspaper, eliminating the two pages on which the
offending stories appeared, or to publish no newspaper at all.""
The Court ultimately concluded that
[E]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.
This standard is consistent with our oft-expressed view that the
education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of
federal judges.
60. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260.
61. Id. at 262.
62. Id. The deleted pages contained two articles; one dealing with teen pregnancy at
the school and the other dealing with divorce and its effect on students. School officials
feared that the pregnancy story may cause embarrassment of students in the school that
had become pregnant (though false names were used), and worried that a particular
parent's privacy would be compromised based on a student interviewee talking about
divorce. Id. at 265-66.
63. Mr. Emerson served as interim instructor for Hazelwood's Journalism II class
during the end of the 1982-1983 academic year. Students in the Journalism class
submitted a six-page proof of what they desired to be the final newspaper of the semester.
Mr. Emerson delivered the proof to Mr. Reynolds, who objected to the two articles in
question. After submitting the proofs back to Mr. Emerson to make changes or come up
with new articles, Mr. Emerson decided to publish the paper without the two questionable
articles. Id. at 263-64.
64. Id. at 264.
65. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
The Court reasoned further that the only constitutionally
permissible censorship of school-sponsored speech (be it a
publication or theatrical production, for example) occurs when the
expression "has no valid educational purpose that the First
Amendment is so directly and sharply implicated as to require judicial
intervention to protect students' constitutional rights."6
High school speech that falls outside of the pedagogical (or
educational) barrier may be banned consistent with Hazelwood, and
as determined by school officials themselves. Thus, a simple
determination that a certain type of speech has no educational use
(from the school's perspective and not the students') may lead to
particular types (or genres) of speech being proscribed.
Commentators have pushed against the extension of Hazelwood to
higher education, stating the following:
Unlike primary and secondary schools, the Court has long held,
college campuses are unquestionably a "marketplace of ideas."
Exposure to many viewpoints indeed historically has been a
defining characteristic of higher education. With this mindset,
the Supreme Court has held, for example, that a university
cannot fire employees pursuant to state law for belonging to the
Communist Party. To do so, the Court has stated, would
contravene the notion that the "[njation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange
of ideas."a
Further, "in recent decades, the vast majority of courts have
recognized only a limited role for free speech in primary and
secondary schools, in sharp contrast to the broader free speech rights
granted to college students."" Perhaps the reasoning for limiting
speech in primary and secondary education approaches a
government's desire to instill impressionable youth with certain civic
values. As another commentator states:
The dilemma of public education is thus manifest. Because few
institutions affect young, impressionable personalities as
profoundly as do our schools, we as a community are justifiably
concerned that our educations program should promote the
"right" skills and values for the development of an individual
66. Id.
67. Mark J. Fiore, Comment, Trampling the "Marketplace of Ideas": The Case Against
Extending Hazelwood to College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1948-49 (2002).
68. Id. at 1951.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 39:3640
Spring 2012] FIRST AMENDMENT AND MULTICULTURAL UNIVERSITIES 641
capable of contributing in a meaningful way to our community.
Yet by authorizing schools to develop this "right" environment,
we leave our children highly vulnerable to "village tyrants" who
might pervert the education process. Under the guise of
properly educating the young, government could predispose
children to accept and defer to authority while passively
adopting prevailing values and current attitudes. The school
system, consequently, epitomizes the tension between liberty
and authority.
Ingber thus worries about applying rules of primary and
secondary schools to colleges and universities-the former being
decidedly more authoritarian and giving greater judicial deference to
school administration. In that case, college students would never be
in a position to fully articulate their own ideas (and ideals), and would
be under the thumb of government-sponsored education at every step
of the process."o For that reason, he and Fiore would refuse to extend
the "pedagogical concerns" analysis to free speech issues on college
campuses."
But there is at least one Circuit Court of Appeals that would
apply this pedagogical standard to college and university campuses.
Judge Easterbrook articulates why pedagogical-analysis reasoning
may extend to college and university campus speech:
[P]1aintiffs argue, and the district court held, that Hazelwood is
inapplicable to university newspapers and that post-secondary
educators therefore cannot insist that student newspapers be
submitted for review and approval. Yet this footnote does not
even hint at the possibility of an on/off switch: high school
papers reviewable, college papers not reviewable. It addresses
degrees of deference. Whether some review is possible depends
on the answer to the public-forum question, which does not
(automatically) vary with the speakers' age. Only when courts
assess the reasonableness of the asserted pedagogical
justification in nonpublic-forum situations does age come into
play, and in a way suggested by the passage we have quoted
from Hazelwood's text. To the extent that the justification for
69. Stanley Ingber, Liberty and Authority: Two Facets of the Inculcation of Virtue, 69
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 421, 430 (1995).
70. Doesn't this sound akin to what a certain infamous anarchist rock band warned
against? See PINK FLOYD, Another Brick in the Wall, Part 2, on THE WALL, DISC ONE
(Sony/Columbia 1987). "We don't need no education, we don't need no thought control. /
No dark sarcasm in the classroom, Teachers leave them kids alone. / Hey! Teachers!
Leave them kids alone!" Id.
71. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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editorial control depends on an audience's maturity, the
difference between high school and university students may be
important. (Not that any line could be bright; many high school
seniors are older than some college freshmen, and junior
colleges are similar to many high schools.)"
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that since the Hazelwood Court
declined to extend its reasoning for limiting high school speech to
public colleges and universities in a footnote, the Court had no strong
feelings on the matter." Therefore, Judge Easterbrook extends the
Hazelwood pedagogical concerns analysis to higher education. The
Seventh Circuit appears to be the only court willing to extend
Hazelwood this far.
Consider, though, the Supreme Court practice of including
immensely important rules of law within the footnotes of an opinion."
Carolene Products' "Famous Footnote Four" created the modern
levels of judicial scrutiny-rational basis review for legislation that
deals with economic matters and strict scrutiny for legislation that, on
its face, violates the United States Constitution or attempts to
discriminate against minority groups.7 1 "Footnote Four . . . has
72. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1169
(2005).
73. For an interesting explanation of the legal community's use of footnotes, see J.M.
Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 275, 276 (1989).
Symbolically, of course, the footnote is of minor importance. It is relegated
to the bottom of the page (or, in the case of endnotes, to the back of the
volume). It is excluded from the main body of the text, either because it
disturbs the flow of the text, because it is unessential to the argument, or
because it is a digression or afterthought.
Id. However, even Balkin agrees that the footnote retains a high level of utility. "Perhaps
the footnote might state the real point of the argument in a highly economical way ....
Perhaps, then, the footnote is an afterthought, but the thoughts that come after . .. might
be more important, more clear, more to the point. Here [as in other contexts] the
footnote has become more important than the text." Balkin, supra note 73, at 280.
74. See Student Gov't Ass'n v. Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 474, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989);
Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc); see generally Brown v.
Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002).
75. See U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (referred to as
"Famous Footnote Four") and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966)
(known as "Brennan's Ratchet").
76. One commentator explains the effect of Footnote Four in this way:
Legislation regulating commercial transactions was not to be invalidated
unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such
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become the most famous footnote in constitutional law. It has come
to stand for one of the most intriguing theoretical approaches to
judicial review, an approach that has attracted brilliant exegesis and
equally powerful criticism."" Another legendary footnote in
American constitutional law is known as "Brennan's Ratchet."
Under the Ratchet theory, Congress may only expand liberties that
the Court has determined to be within the ambit of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it may not
restrict those liberties. While many commentators rejected Justice
Brennan's reasoning, Brennan's Ratchet remained positive law until
it was overruled in City of Boerne v. Flores."' Famous Footnote Four
and Brennan's Ratchet, at the very least, undercut Judge
Easterbrook's reasoning that the Court had not fully considered the
matter solely because the Supreme Court placed important language
in a footnote. In contrast, the Supreme Court's refusal to extend the
pedagogical concerns analysis to higher education in a footnote
a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.
Having clothed economic legislation with so strong a presumption of
constitutionality, Justice Stone recognized that he might be diluting the
constitutional protection afforded individual rights. In the now-famous
footnote four, he conceded that "[t]here may be narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality" when legislation (1)
"appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,"
or (2) "restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation," or (3) discriminates against
minorities .... Thus the Court's dual standard of review was born.
Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner,
61 WASH. L. REV. 293, 301 (quoting Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4).
77. Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products
Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 165 (2004).
78. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
79. See id. ("We emphasize that Congress' power under § 5 [of the Fourteenth
Amendment] is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the
Amendment; [it] grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these
guarantees.").
80. See generally William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and
Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 606-08 (1975) (discussing the analytical flaws in
Brennan's theory).
81. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 528 ("There is language in our opinion in
Katzenbach v. Morgan which could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress
to enact legislation that expands the rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This is not a necessary interpretation, however, or even the best one.").
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should not be misunderstood to imply that the Court felt the matter
was unimportant to the opinion's analysis.
In sum, when a university creates a limited public forum for its
students' expression, it may constitutionally proscribe speech in
reasonable and content neutral ways. The vast majority of Circuit
Courts refuse to extend the limited public forum to primary and
secondary education, though, due to the differences in context.82
However, speech restrictions based on race, gender, and religion
(even in an attempt to maintain proper separation between church
and state) have not passed constitutional muster. Through the entire
process of examining proper speech within the walls of a public
university, much deference has been given to college and university
administrators and how they may choose to confront an individual
situation.
C. Deference Makes a Difference
As mentioned, courts tend to give deference to school officials in
making decisions regarding student speech on campus, at the very
least allowing administrators and officials to offer vast amounts of
information as to whether their policies are reasonable in light of the
particularities at each given school. As early as 1972, and as recently
as 2010, the Court recognized that the federal bench may not always
be the appropriate place to pass judgment on the effectiveness of
school policy. To begin with, Healy stands for the proposition that
the "[e]ducation of the nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of
federal judges."" The Supreme Court in Hendrick Community
School District v. Rowley stated that courts should "resist substituting
their notions of sound educational policy for those of the school
authorities which they review."" The Martinez Court, in line with
Rowley and Healy asserted that "[s]chools, we have emphasized,
enjoy 'a significant measure of authority over the type of officially
recognized activities in which their students participate."'"
Therefore, with a history of federal judges giving deference to
university administrators, campus speech problems must be
approached with special caution since "decisions about the character
82. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
83. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
84. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).
85. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2989 (2010) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside
Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 240 (1990)).
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of [university] student-run program[s] are due decent respect."" But
why have courts traditionally deferred to university administrators in
determining the reasonableness of a given policy? Further, how
much respect should be given?
1. Why Give Deference?
At the lower court level, it is likely that federal judges have very
little experience with the inner workings of higher education. Further
up the appellate chain, the likelihood is greater that a judge or justice
has been professionally involved with university administration. For
example, a former Dean of Harvard Law School and four former
law professors currently sit on the Supreme Court." Given the five
members who understand the complicated decisions that must be
made on a university campus, if the Supreme Court decided to take
more control of campus speech matters, it may now have the
expertise to do so.
Yet waiting for more cases to move up the appellate chain seems
like an inefficient way to deal with First Amendment jurisprudence in
the sphere of higher education. Allowing administrators to enact
policies tailored to the idiosyncrasies of their own particular school
prevents a judge from crafting student policy. Further, if a judge
actively addressed each and every university policy that came before
him or her, administrators might resort to consulting legal counsel (or
risk litigation) in every decision to ratify a student group or grant a
speech permit. That would overly burden the court system and likely
raise education costs for students.89
86. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2989.
87. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Jan. 15,
2011). Justice Kagan was a Professor at both the University of Chicago School of Law and
Harvard Law School, and was named the eleventh Dean of Harvard Law School in 2003.
Id.
88. Justice Scalia taught at University of Virginia School of Law and the University of
Chicago School of Law, Justice Kennedy taught at the McGeorge School of Law at
University of the Pacific, Justice Ginsburg taught at Rutgers University School of Law,
and Justice Breyer taught at Harvard Law School and Harvard University Kennedy
School of Government. Id.
89. See generally WILLIAM A. KAPLAN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER
EDUCATION § 2.2.2 (4th ed. 2006).
[The] concept of academic deference is a branch of a more general concept
of judicial deference that encompasses a variety of circumstances in which,
and reasons for which, a court should defer to the expertise of some decision
maker other than itself. Issues regarding deference can play a vital,
sometimes even dispositive, role in litigation involving higher educational
2. The Rational Alternatives
Perhaps the most theoretical and far-fetched explanation for
judicial deference, though maybe the most effective, involves giving
greater autonomy and respect to students in the university context to
change administrative policies through active student governments.
The students in Healy who wished to form an SDS chapter had to
apply to a student-run body to gain school recognition, and their
fellow students denied the application.90
On many large campuses, student governments wield
considerable power over both the granting of recognition and the
allocation of funding to student groups. For example, to gain
recognition as a student group at Oklahoma State University, a
student group must petition the Student Government Association
and, if approved, undergo a sixteen-week trial period before official
recognition is granted. Included in this hands-on approach to group
recognition is the requirement that a representative of the student
group sign an "Affirmation of Compliance" that includes the
University's policy on nondiscrimination. The statement is
reproduced below:
In furtherance of its educational objectives and programs,
Oklahoma State University extends recognition to a wide
variety of student organizations in accordance with policies and
procedures in the Student Rights and Responsibilities
document. It is the position of Oklahoma State University that
registered and recognized student organizations may not
exclude students from membership on the basis of race,
national origin, sex or creed.
All registered and recognized student organizations shall affirm
to the University that their membership selection policies and
procedures are in compliance with this policy. In the case of
regional, national, or internationally affiliated groups,
Oklahoma State University chapters must affirm to the
University that membership selection policies and procedures
of the parent organization do not require the chapter to exclude
institutions . . . . Sometimes requests for deference are framed as claims to
institutional autonomy; sometimes as "institutional academic freedom"
claims or faculty academic freedom claims; and sometimes as "relative
institutional competence" claims, asserting that the institution's or the
faculty's competence over the matter at issue overshadows that of the court.
Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
90. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 172 (1972).
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any student from membership on the basis of race, national
origin, sex or creed. 91
By allowing student governments to police the groups allowed
and recognized on their own campuses, the courts do not need to
determine whether official recognition ought to be awarded in every
instance.' Thus, the student government approach is more efficient,
more deferential towards colleges and universities, and a more
effective way for students (and not the courts) to determine what is
appropriate for their individual campuses.
II. CLS v. Martinez and the Twenty-First Century Approach
The most recent case involving student speech and association
came before the court in 2010." Martinez confronts whether "a public
law school [may] condition its official recognition of a student
group-and the attendant use of school funds and facilities-on the
organization's agreement to open eligibility for membership and
leadership to all students."" The Court determined that Hastings
College of the Law had created a limited public forum, that its
policies were reasonable and content neutral, and that it may
constitutionally deny the Christian Legal Society ("CLS") funding
based on its membership requirements.
A. The Facts
In 2004, a group of students at University of California, Hastings
College of the Law, attempted to form a local chapter of CLS on the
campus of the public law school. In order to gain official recognition,
the students had to go through the "Registered Student
Organization" ("RSO") program.95  After official recognition is
attained a student group may
seek financial assistance from the Law School . . . use Law-
School channels to communicate with students . . . may place
announcements in a weekly Office-of-Student-Services
91. Packet for Registering New Student Organizations, OKLAHOMA STATE
UNIVERSITY STUDENT GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION, http://www.osusga.com/wp-content/
uploads/2010/07/new-student-organization-packet-fillable.pdf.
92. This, of course, assumes an "all-comers" policy that is reasonable and viewpoint
neutral.
93. See CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2971 (2010).
94. Id. at 2978.
95. Id. at 2979.
newsletter, advertise events on designated bulletin boards, send
e-mails using a Hastings-organization address, and participate
in an annual Student Organizations Fair designed to advance
recruitment efforts. In addition, RSOs may apply for
permission to use the Law School's facilities for meetings and
office space. Finally, Hastings allows officially recognized
groups to use its name and logo.
In order to gain the benefits of RSO status mentioned above,
"RSOs must abide by certain conditions."97 Most importantly, all
RSOs must comply with the law school's nondiscrimination policy, set
forth in its entirety here:
[Hastings] is committed to a policy against legally
impermissible, arbitrary or unreasonable discriminatory
practices. All groups, including administration, faculty, student
governments, [Hastings]-owned student residence facilities and
programs sponsored by [Hastings], are governed by this policy
of nondiscrimination. [Hastings'] policy on nondiscrimination is
to comply fully with applicable law.
[Hastings] shall not discriminate unlawfully on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or
sexual orientation. This nondiscrimination policy covers
admission, access and treatment in Hastings-sponsored
98programs and activities.
B. The Policy
According to Hastings, compliance with the nondiscrimination
statement mandates an "all-comers" policy in which all groups "must
allow any student to participate, become a member, or seek
leadership positions in the organization, regardless of [her] status or
beliefs." 99 This type of policy (and practice) is similar to those of
many major law schools across the country." Ironically, the policy
was written in such a way as to eliminate cases of this very type from
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Hastings' nondiscrimination policy is also available on the school website and
may be found at www.uchastings.edu/asuch/docs/ResolutionNondiscriminationPolicy.doc.
Compare Oklahoma State University policy quoted in supra note 92.
99. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2979 (2010).
100. See id. at 2980 (stating that the law schools at Georgetown and Hofstra have
adopted similar policies).
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arising. It was put in place to limit discrimination cases against the
school by encouraging multiculturalism and the intermingling of
different ideas in the campus marketplace.
The Hastings all-comers policy finds itself in direct conflict with
the goals (or at least the practice) of the Christian Legal Society,
which demands that its voting members (and any member wishing to
rise to a leadership position) sign a "Statement of Faith" and adhere
to a lifestyle which does not violate the belief "that sexual activity
should not occur outside of marriage between a man and a woman";
it also excludes "anyone who engages in 'unrepentant homosexual
conduct."'m In addition, CLS "excludes students who hold religious
convictions different from those in the Statement of Faith."'02 CLS
submitted the required application for recognition as an RSO, which
included a set of bylaws mandated by the CLS national
organization." "Several days later, the Law School rejected the
application; CLS's bylaws, Hastings explained, did not comply with
the Nondiscrimination Policy because CLS barred students based on
religion and sexual orientation."'
It would be hard to argue that the CLS bylaws were not
discriminatory (though at oral argument CLS refused to concede that
fact and relied only on its freedom of association and religion
arguments)."' From the plain text of the Statement of Faith, Muslim
students, Jewish students, and homosexual students would be
excluded from the organization based solely on their religion or
sexual orientation. Hastings recognized such potential discrimination
and required that CLS "open membership to all students irrespective
of their religious beliefs or sexual orientation" in order to gain RSO
status."" But the law school proposed a bargain: Although it would
refuse to grant CLS status as an RSO, it would allow CLS to use
school facilities and have access to common modes of communication
with the student body.0  "Hastings would do nothing to suppress
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Transcript of Oral Arguments, CLS v. Martinez, 130 U.S. 2971 (2008) (No. 08-
1371), 2010 WL 1540008, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/
argument transcripts/08-1371.pdf.
106. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2980-81.
107. Id. at 2981. It appears that the CLS group took advantage of school facilities on
numerous occasions in order to hold regularly scheduled meetings and an end-of-the-year
banquet. Id.
CLS's endeavors, but neither would it lend RSO-level support for
them."'0o
C. Enter the Courts
CLS eventually filed suit alleging that Hastings' refusal to extend
RSO status to the organization constituted violations of its First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech, freedom of association,
and the free exercise of religion. The District Court ruled in favor
of Hastings, reasoning that the "all-comers condition on access to a
limited public forum ... was both reasonable and viewpoint neutral,
and therefore did not violate CLS's right to free speech."o Further,
the District Court found no restriction to CLS's expression because
"Hastings' denial of official recognition ... was not a substantial
impediment to CLS's ability to meet and communicate as a group.""'
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court in an opinion that
drones on for all of forty-four words. The entire opinion is quoted
here: "The parties stipulate that Hastings imposes an open
membership rule on all student groups-all groups must accept all
comers as voting members even if those individuals disagree with the
mission of the group. The conditions on recognition are therefore
viewpoint neutral and reasonable." 2
1. Creating the Public Forum
To properly analyze student speech in the context of higher
education, the Court first had to follow the Healy-Widmar-
Rosenberger line of cases and determine whether Hastings had
created a limited public forum:
[T]he Court has permitted restriction on access to a limited
public forum, like the RSO program here, with this key caveat:
Any access barrier must be reasonable and viewpoint
neutral. . . . Second, in the context of public accommodations,
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2974 (referring to the lower court decision of Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter
of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll, of Law v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW, 2006 WL 997217
(N.D. Cal. 2006)).
111. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2981 (internal quotation marks omitted). For
further discussion of CLS's abilities to meet and communicate as a group, see infra Section
E.
112. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of Univ. of Cal, Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Kane,
319 Fed. App'x 645 (9th Cir. 2009).
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we have subjected restrictions on that freedom to close scrutiny;
such restrictions are permitted only if they serve "compelling
state interests" that are "unrelated to the suppression of
ideas"-interests that cannot be advanced through . . .
113significantly less restrictive means.
Colleges and universities in this context create not a complete
public forum, but a limited one-and may restrict speech in certain
situations."' For example, "a speaker may be excluded from a limited
public forum if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose
especial benefit the forum was created.""' Though some cases will
distinguish between freedom of speech and freedom of association for
limited public forum determination, "[tihe same ground rules must
govern both speech and association challenges in the limited-public-
forum context, lest strict scrutiny trump a public university's ability to
confine a speech forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for
which it was created.""6
Based on the preceding, the Court determined that Hastings had
successfully created a limited public forum in its creation of the RSO
system, in which students who followed the policies put in place for
the forum enjoyed its full use, while student groups who did not agree
to accept all of RSO's mandates (including the all-comers system
created by the Nondiscrimination policy) were denied entrance into
the limited forum.
2. Reasonableness of the Forum
Next, the Court needed to decide whether the policy created by
Hastings in the limited public forum was reasonable. Given the
peculiarity of facts presented in each college and university, the court
does not apply a blanket rule in considering the reasonableness of
school policies. The Court observes that First Amendment rights
"must be analyzed in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment."' Further, "[t]he state may not exclude speech where
113. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984-85 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 623 (1984)).
114. See discussion on limited public forum, supra Part II.
115. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
116. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2986. See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189
(1972) ("Associational activities need not be tolerated where they infringe reasonable
campus rules . . . .").
117. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2988 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268
n.5 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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its distinction is not reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum,. . . nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of ...
viewpoint."" 8  If a policy restricting speech is not reasonable, any
regulation of speech may be held unconstitutional."'
Hastings first argued that its "open access policy ensures that the
leadership, educational, and social opportunities afforded by RSOs
are available to all students."20 In that way, "the all-comers policy
ensures that no Hastings student is forced to fund a group [through
student activity fees] that would reject her as a member."21  The all-
comers policy also helps Hastings police the written terms of its
nondiscrimination policy without inquiring into an RSO's motivation
for membership. Requiring all RSOs to adhere to certain policies
reasonably put in place by the school allows the school to turn a blind
eye to each organization's particular (perhaps hidden) subjective
views and motivations-as long as the group does not restrict
membership to any student, it may take advantage of RSO
recognition and all that comes with it. Lastly, the nondiscrimination
policy brings together individuals with diverse backgrounds and
beliefs, and encourages tolerance, cooperation, and learning among
students.2 2  The Court concluded that given all of Hastings'
justifications, its policies are "surely reasonable in light of the RSO
forum's purposes."123
CLS argued against these points, as was to be expected,
maintaining that the restrictions were not reasonable. However, that
argument ran into a problem by
118. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2988 (quoting Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995)).
119. Interestingly, while the Court concedes that it will give some deference to school
administration based on "the peculiar facts of each college and university," the Court
"owe[s] no deference to universities when [it] considers [whether] a university policy is
constitutional." CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2988. Justice Stevens would afford more
deference to Hastings officials, stating that the nondiscrimination policy reflects a
judgment "that discrimination by school officials or organizations on the basis of certain
factors, such as race and religion, is less tolerable than discrimination on the basis of other
factors." Id. at 2997 (Stevens, J., concurring). He painted the issue a bit broader, though,
stating that "[a]s a general matter, courts should respect universities' judgments and let
them manage their own affairs." Id. at 2998 (Stevens, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 2989.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2990.
123. Id. at 2991.
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focusing on the benefits its must forego (SBA funds, access to
certain bulletin boards, email system and address, and use of
school facilities) while ignoring the interest of those it seeks to
fence out: Exclusion, after all, has two sides. Hastings, caught
in the crossfire between a group's desire to exclude and
students' demand for equal access, may reasonably draw a line
in the sand permitting all organizations to express what they
wish but no group to discriminate in membership. 24
3. Viewpoint Neutrality
Once determining that the policy was reasonable, the Court also
needed to determine if it was viewpoint neutral. The majority
opinion makes short work of this point because the Hastings
nondiscrimination policy openly refuses to discriminate or choose
certain speech for proscription based on any criteria. "An all-comers
condition on access to RSO status, in short, is textbook viewpoint
neutral."125 "Even if a regulation has a differential impact on groups
wishing to enforce exclusionary membership policies, '[wihere the
[State] does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content,
acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a
discriminatory idea or philosophy."'
2 6
D. Justice Alito's Possibility of a Hostile Takeover
Justice Alito authored the dissent in Martinez, in which Justices
Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas joined. A particularly interesting
section of the dissent discusses whether the Hastings all-comers policy
would allow for a hostile takeover of any organization, stating that
"Hastings does not really have an accept-all-comers policy-it has an
accept-some-dissident-comers policy-and the line between members
who merely seek to change a group's message (who apparently must
be admitted) and those who seek a group's 'demise' (who may be
kept out) is hopelessly vague." 27
The dissent then argues that since organizations would be forced
to accept all students as members, small organizations, especially,
might be overrun by dissident students who only wish to assume
leadership roles in order to disband the organization itself. It lays out
the following scenario:
124. Id. at 2993.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2994 (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992)).
127. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3019 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Suppose that 10 students who are members of [religious]
denominations that disagree with CLS decided that CLS was
misrepresenting true Christian doctrine. Suppose that these
students joined CLS, elected officers who shared their views,
ended the group's affiliation with the national organization, and
changed the group's message. The new leadership would likely
proclaim that the group was "vital" but rectified, while CLS, I
assume, would take the view that the old group had suffered its
"demise." Whether a change represents reform or transformation
may depend very much on the eye of the beholder.m8
The result of such a situation would then "permit[] small
unpopular groups to be taken over by students who wish to change
the views that the group expresses."129 What Justice Alito fails to
recognize, though, is the utter impracticality of his exercise into the
conceivable.
To begin, his point must be conceded: The Hastings all-comers
policy mandates that a student group must allow students to join even
if the student does not share the core beliefs of the organization. By
definition, that is what an all-comers policy seeks. The goals of the
policy are to encourage diversity of views in a shared marketplace.
By defending one's views or beliefs against a hostile (or skeptical)
audience, one's own views become more comprehensive and sound.'30
Justice Alito's point loses ground, however, by assuming that an
organized group of students would care enough about, and take the
time, to overrun an organization with views contrary to their own.
Especially during the tumultuous three years of law school (using the
facts of Martinez), the likelihood of a student making the conscious
effort to be voted into leadership of an organization only to kill it are
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Or, at the very least, one's own perspective on the argument may change. "As
iron sharpens iron, so one man sharpens another." Proverbs 27:17. For an interesting
(albeit unconventional) commentary on this verse, see CALEB GRIMES, STAR WARS
JESUS: A SPIRITUAL COMMENTARY ON THE REALITY OF THE FORCE 218 (2007).
We have better things to sharpen iron with today, but we do not have
anything better to sharpen mankind with than ourselves. Often we lose this
wisdom and either try to replace mentoring and friendship, speed it up, or
get rid of it. So it's invigorating to see the mentoring and apprenticeship in
Star Wars. Even though Obi-Wan is now a master on the Jedi Council and
Anakin a full Jedi, there is still learning and teaching back and forth
between them . . . . These relationships foster better, more complete,
teaching, but also encourage the value and identity of an individual as a
person.
Id.
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next to nil. Assuming that the possibility of a hostile takeover exists,
the group's original members still have access to a school's
recognition process. They could simply start another organization
and carry on with the values they desire the group to have. Also, the
national organization could refuse recognition to the now-rogue
chapter that is misrepresenting the organization's mission. Similar
groups that share most, but not all, values can coexist in a forum that
encourages nondiscrimination. Even in such situations, groups likely
would benefit from exploring and understanding the subtle
differences between their beliefs.13'
Perhaps Justice Alito's hypothetical takeover could hold water if
evidence had shown student discontent with CLS or similar
organizations. Yet no such evidence was presented into the opinion.
A stronger point made by the dissent (though not taken up here)
concerns the fact that some religious groups cannot accept all comers;
some groups "cannot in good conscience agree in their bylaws that
they will admit persons who do not share their faith, and for these
groups, the consequence of an accept-all-comers policy is
marginalization."'32 However, within the confines of a limited public
forum, a university need not allow all types of speech, or every
speaker, access to the same podium.
E. Social Media as a Reasonable Alternative to Open Public Speech
Another particularly troubling portion of the opinion, this time
in the majority, concerns whether CLS suffered actual prejudice and
whether the denial of typical communication channels is no longer
relevant due to the rise of internet communication and social media.
To wit, by denying CLS recognition as an RSO, Hastings limited the
group from using "RSO-specific communication."'3 3 The Court then
stated that "the advent of electronic media and social-networking
sites reduces the importance of those [RSO-specific] channels." 34 Is
the Court saying, then, that the existence and vast visibility of social
networking sites reduces any prejudice CLS may have suffered from
denial of recognition?
131. While no ready example has been found, groups with subtle distinctions in
message can be found in religious organizations on school campuses. For instance, a
"Catholic Student Association" and a "Baptist Student Group" could amicably discuss
(for example) their diverging views of transubstantiation, but agree on the usefulness of
communion.
132. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3019.
133. Id. at 2991.
134. Id.
Taken to its logical conclusion, the availability of social
networking websites like Facebook and Twitter, which are
increasingly seen as legitimate and professional methods of
communication," would diminish the necessity of RSO recognition in
its entirety. Since Hastings is willing to allow CLS to use campus
facilities for meetings and post on campus bulletin boards, CLS
suffers no prejudice from denial if it can gain access to students
through social media. As an example of its assertion, the Court states
that "[p]rivate groups, from fraternities and sororities to social clubs
and secret societies, commonly maintain a presence at universities
without school affiliation."'36
The majority cites a Seventh Circuit case to buttress its
reasoning. Christian Legal Society v. Walker states that "[m]ost
universities and colleges, and most college-aged students,
communicate through email, websites, and hosts like MySpace . ... If
CLS had its own website, any student at the school with access to
Google-that is, all of them-could easily have found it."'37 Again,
taking this reasoning to its conclusion, a university may state that all
student groups may be forbidden from using campus-sponsored lines
135. Social networking websites have even been legitimized by the courts as a valuable
source for evidentiary information to be used in litigation. See Romano v. Steelcase Inc.,
907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (S. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. 2010) (holding that "[s]ince Plaintiff knew that
her information may become publicly available [on Facebook], she cannot now claim that
she had a reasonable expectation of privacy.").
136. CLS v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2991. This author doubts the assertion that large
student groups "commonly" exist on school campuses without recognition by the school
itself. For example, the Greek Life system at Texas Christian University operates entirely
through the school. In fact, "43% of the undergraduate TCU population is affiliated with
a fraternity or sorority." FSL Quick Fact, TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY,
www.greeks.tcu.edu. From the university-owned sorority houses to a full-time staff
member that holds the title of "Director of Fraternity and Sorority Life," the school
controls many aspects of the Greek community. See Fraternity and Sorority Life, TEXAS
CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY, www.greeks.tcu.edu. Oklahoma City University's Greek
System operates similarly. See generally Greek Life, OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY,
www.okcu.edu/students/greeklife.aspx.
This also holds true in popular media; compare NATIONAL LAMPOON'S ANIMAL
HOUSE (Universal Studios 1978); REVENGE OF THE NERDS (Interscope Commc'ns 1984);
P.C.U. (20th Century Fox 1994). All of these films deal with a fraternity's attempts to gain
official recognition by their university. Contra the Skull and Bones Society at Yale
University. The famous Order of the Skull and Bones has existed at Yale for over a
century, maintaining a strong (even infamous) presence on campus while never being
officially recognized or affiliated with the university itself. See generally ANTHONY C.
SUTrON, AMERICA'S SECRET ESTABLISHMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ORDER OF
SKULL & BONES (2004).
137. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853,
874 (7th Cir. 2006) (Wood. J., dissenting).
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of communication merely because other (maybe even more versatile)
means of communication are easily available. If that were to happen,
student groups and campus organizations would be forbidden from
being sponsored or supported by the school, since the school may not
officially sponsor or support their speech. Surely such a restriction
would not be determined reasonable. Justice Alito's dissent may
even state that denial of campus-based communication limits student
speech.
Conclusion
To conclude, though the Court's limited public forum
jurisprudence has remained unchanged for many years, it still serves
as the proper analytical framework for examining student speech at
public colleges and universities. Further, judicial deference to school
administrators "on the ground" keeps the courts from imposing
unnecessary school policy and allows for a "ground up" management
approach to thrive at institutions of higher education. Lastly, CLS v.
Martinez, while not ruffling too many feathers, reaffirms Supreme
Court deference to reasonable school policies protecting freedom of
speech and association while maintaining the university sphere as a
"marketplace of ideas." Though the opinion may have some
weaknesses in dicta, its holding will remain strong in the future.
Further, Hastings College of the Law should be congratulated in
its recognition of the valuable experiences to be gained when students
are put in situations where they must interact with others who may
hold different beliefs. By instituting a policy where no group can
exclude, Hastings implicitly states that everyone's ideas and beliefs
hold equal value, and all are entitled to share those beliefs with
others. While the point is well taken that some groups cannot include
everyone, it should not be the policy of universities to discourage
open communication, even if that speech is not what other students,
or school administrators, would like to hear.
This rings especially true given the recent events that
perpetuated at the campus of University of California, Davis, in
which campus police methodically, and without regard to safety or
health, used nonlethal force to disrupt a peaceful protest of
students.'38 Note that university administration does not represent the
final arbiter of what constitutes as "acceptable" student speech, and if
138. http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/20/local/la-me-occupy-uc-davis- 20111120 (last
visited Jan. 15, 2011).
a university allows student groups to peaceably assemble without
disruption of vital campus activities, the content of the student's
speech is of no import. While particular words have enormous
power, silent presence can carry incredible weight.
Student demonstration, like student association, falls within the
ambit of the limited public forum. Therefore, a public college or
university cannot constitutionally deny access to publically available
locations based solely on the message that a gathering of students
wishes to express. Above all else, content neutrality must be
observed when dealing with student speech. As mentioned
previously, a university need not allow all types of speech, or every
speaker, access to the same podium."' However, once access to that
podium is allowed, the university is divested of the ability to decide
for the student what can and cannot be said. "If there is a time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence."40
139. See supra Part III.D.
140. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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